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We study the impact of transfer pricing rules on sales prices, ﬁrms’ organizational structure, and 
consumers’ utility within a two-country monopolistic competition model featuring source-based 
proﬁt taxes that differ across countries. Firms can either become multinationals, i.e., they serve the 
foreign market through a fully controlled affiliate; or they can become exporters, i.e., they serve the 
foreign market by contracting with an independent distributor. Compared to the benchmark cases, 
where tax authorities are either unable to audit ﬁrms or where they are able to audit them perfectly, 
the use of the OECD’s Comparable Uncontrolled Price (CUP) or Cost-Plus (CP) rule distorts ﬁrms’ 
output and pricing decisions. The reason is that the comparable arm’s length transactions between 
exporters  and  distributors,  which  serve  as  benchmarks,  are  not  efficient.  We  show  that 
implementing the CUP or CP rules is detrimental to consumers in the low tax country, yet beneﬁts 
consumers in the high tax country. 
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Multinationals have strong incentives to minimize their tax liability by using transfer prices to
manipulate corporate proﬁts. High transfer prices charged for goods sold to a liates operating in
high tax countries serve as a tool that allows those ﬁrms to repatriate proﬁts to low tax countries,
thereby reducing their overall tax burden. When ﬁrms face no restrictions, transfer prices may
become pure tax-evasion devices with no economic meaning. Obvious examples include ﬁrms which
“sold toothbrushes between subsidiaries for $5,655 each”, or others which were “buying plastic
buckets for $973 each and tweezers for $4,896.”1 Tax authorities thus have a strong incentive to
recover tax revenue by auditing multinationals, by restricting their freedom to set transfer prices,
by contesting their tax declarations, and by negotiating possible settlements.
While transfer pricing certainly is often far from economic reality and puts strain on the cor-
porate proﬁts tax base, not all ﬁrms ‘sell buckets for a thousand bucks’. Put di erently, not all
transfer prices are pure tax-evasion devices. Hence, when tax authorities do interfer with ﬁrms’
transfer pricing decisions they are likely to create ine ciencies that distort market prices and ﬁrms’
organizational choices, and which increase the cost of running global corporations. Furthermore,
“a system that forces on multinational ﬁrms similar prices to those faced by unrelated ﬁrms misses
the point of multinationals: to cut costs by locating their activities more e ciently around the
world.”2 Business men complain that “transfer pricing [...] forces us to spend a lot of time doing
things that are pointless from a business point of view. We have to waste time trying to price un-
ﬁnished goods being ‘sold’ from one plant to another. [...] Businesses want to organise as if there
were a single global or regional product market. Instead, tax is determining how they organise
themselves. [...] The tax system promotes parochial thinking.”3
To cope with these conﬂicting problems, the OECD has suggested a set of guidelines to alleviate
market distortions while helping tax authorities and multinationals to reach mutually satisfactory
agreements (OECD, 2001). The economic e ciency of those guidelines is generally based on
the notion of arm’s length price, which is “the price two unrelated parties would reach through
bargaining in a competitive market” (Eden, 1998, p.602). As multinationals are known to operate
in imperfectly competitive markets, the OECD guidelines are likely to reﬂect market distortions
arising even between unrelated parties.
This paper studies the market distortions implied by the two mostly frequently used transfer
pricing rules in the OECD guidelines, namely, the Comparable Uncontrolled Price (henceforth,
CUP) and the Cost Plus (henceforth, CP) rules (see Ernst & Young, 2002). To do so, we develop
1The Economist, “A taxing battle”, 1/31/2004, Vol. 370 Issue 8360, p.71–72; Op cit., “Discord over harmony”,
11/12/2005, Vol. 377 Issue 8452, p. 82–82
2The Economist, “Taxing questions”, 5/22/93, Vol. 327 Issue 7812, p.73.
3The Economist, “Gimme shelter”, 01/29/2000, Vol. 354 Issue 8155, Special section p. 15–17.
2a two-country trade model ` a la Krugman (1980) with corporate tax di erentials and costly trade
across countries. Firms have a single production plant and sell di erentiated products in their
domestic and their foreign markets. They can decide to become multinationals, by owning a
foreign a liate which markets and distributes the product in the foreign market; or they can
become exporters by delegating these tasks to a foreign independent distributor. Exporters and
independent distributors enter into arm’s length relationships that generate ine ciencies because
independent distributors have control over their tasks. Such ine ciencies do not arise within
multinationals that keep full management control (Grossman and Hart, 1986). Once, ﬁrms have
chosen their structures, they set their market prices, decide on how to split their transport costs
among business units and decide on their transfer prices between units.
We show that transfer prices under OECD rules reﬂect the ine ciencies of arm’s length re-
lationships between exporters and independent distributors. In particular, when tax authorities
apply the CUP rule, they constrain multinationals to set their transfer prices at the same lev-
els than those prevailing in comparable uncontrolled transactions. Yet, comparable uncontrolled
transactions need not, in general, be e cient. Transfer prices are thus biased upwards and a ect
positively the proﬁts of multinationals producing in the low tax country and negatively those of
multinationals producing in the high tax country. Concerning the pricing distortions, our key
results may be summarized as follows. First, multinationals are indi erent as to the exact im-
putation of transport costs between their a liates. Second, the CUP rule is equivalent to the
CP rule in which transfer prices are set to the manufacturing cost reported by the a liates plus
an ‘appropriate’ margin in the industry. This result allows us to simplify the analysis of market
distortions by covering the CUP and CP rules in the same discussion. Third, we show how the
transfer pricing rules distort prices and outputs. On the one hand, multinationals producing in
the high tax country are enticed to set too high sales prices and to manufacture too little of the
goods they ship to the low tax country. This is because transfer prices are biased upward and
force multinationals to repatriate proﬁts against their will. Multinationals therefore inﬂate prices
in the low tax country to increase their tax base there. On the other hand, multinationals produc-
ing in the low tax country set too high sales prices and manufacture too little of the goods they
ship to the high tax country. The upward biased transfer price allows those ﬁrms to repatriate
proﬁts to the low tax country. Hence, they are enticed to inﬂate their shipments to the foreign
a liates. To sum up, we show that tax discrepancies give rise to price and output distortions
under the OECD transfer pricing rules, whereas they do not when tax authorities acquire perfect
information (perfect audit) or no information at all (no audit).
Turning to distortions in ﬁrms’ organizational choices, our key results may be summarized
as follows. First, the incentives to choose a multinational structure are always larger for the
ﬁrms producing in the high tax country. This is because transfer prices allow multinationals to
shift proﬁts. One the one hand, the multinationals producing in the high tax country are able to
3reduce their domestic tax base on their foreign sales, whereas their fellow-country exporters are not
able to do so with their foreign independent distributors. On the other hand, the multinationals
producing in the low tax country are obliged to report their foreign proﬁts to the foreign tax
authorities. They only avoid the ine ciency in the arm’s length relationship with distributors in
the exporter structure. Their incentives to ‘go multinational’ are therefore weaker. Second, we
show that ﬁrms producing in the low tax country have quite surprisingly stronger incentives to go
multinational when tax authorities apply the OECD rules than when they do not audit the ﬁrms
at all.
Finally, we also discuss the impacts of transfer pricing rules on consumers’ utility. Transfer
pricing rules can have intensive (via the product prices) and extensive (via ﬁrms’ structure) margin
e ects on consumers and those e ects may conﬂict. We show that the intensive margin e ects favor
consumers in the high tax country because multinationals shipping to this country reduce their
sales prices as compared to exporters. By contrast, extensive margin e ects do not favor those
consumers because foreign ﬁrms more often prefer to serve them through independent distributors
who charge higher prices. Interestingly, the intensive margin e ect dominates in the case of the
OECD rules, so that consumers’ utility is higher in the high tax country than it is in the low tax
one. Hence, high tax countries may have lower consumer prices given ﬁrms organizational choices.
Related literature. Since the initial contributions by Copithorne (1971) and Horst (1973), em-
pirical and theoretical research on transfer pricing has expanded rapidly. As summarized by Grezik
(2001), empirical evidence suggests that transfer pricing behavior exists but is not uniform across
industries. More recently, studies by Clausing (2003) and by Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) con-
ﬁrm that transfer prices are signiﬁcantly correlated with the tax rates faced by a liates’ and that
they strongly hamper governments’ e ectiveness to raise revenue using corporate taxes. Swenson
(2002) and Bernard et al. (2008) also report recent evidence on how multinationals manipulate
their a liates’ sales prices. Turning to theory, most existing contributions focus on a single ﬁrm
and assume fully e cient arm’s lenght relationships. In addition, comparable uncontrolled trans-
actions and ‘appropriate’ margins are mostly taken as exogenous or as being unrelated to the
industry conditions that tax authorities are recommended to use. For instance, Itagaki (1979)
considers a simple exogenous transfer price; Halperin and Srinidhi (1987) and Elitzur and Mintz
(1996) assume an exogenous ’appropriate’ mark-up under the CP rule; and Samuelson (1982) takes
the multinational’s (controlled!) mill price as the comparable uncontrolled price to assess foreign
transactions.
The present paper departs from this literature in several ways. First, it discusses transfer pricing
issues within an established intra-industry trade model (Krugman, 1980) that has been extensively
used to explain the behavior of multinationals (Markusen, 2002; Barba Navaretti and Venables,
2004). Second, it analyzes the implications of imperfect arm’s length relationships on transfer
4pricing, whereas most of the literature assumes that arm’s length relationships are e cient. Third,
it considers the issue of the imputation of trade costs between multinationals’ a liates. While many
studies discuss the impact of trade costs and tari s on transfer prices, none has to the best of our
knowledge investigated how a liates declare those costs across countries. Finally, whereas the
existing literature assumes the existence of uncontrolled ﬁrms for the aim of assessing comparable
transactions, this paper discusses the emergence of such ﬁrms as the independent distributors that
are choosen by exporters. Last, note that this paper also weakly relates to the discussions of
ine ciencies in approportionment tax base rules (Nielsen et al., 2003), of government competition
in the design of transfer pricing rules (Mansori and Weichenrieder, 1999; Raimondos-Møller and
Sharf, 2002; Peralta et al., 2006), and on transfer pricing and tax competition (Elitzur and Mintz,
1996).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model. We
study the exporter price and the trade cost imputation decisions in Section 3, and the multinational
prices, trade cost imputation and transfer pricing decisions in Section 4. We do this for each possible
transfer pricing rule. In Section 5, we then discuss the choice of production structure, whereas we
analyze the implications of transfer pricing rules on consumers’ utility in Section 6. We conclude
in Section 7. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The model
2.1 Preferences
Consider an economy with two countries, labeled i =1 ,2. Variables associated with each country
will be subscripted accordingly. Each country hosts the same mass L of consumers–workers, which
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j  = i, (1)
where qji(v) denotes the consumption of variety v in country i when it is produced in country j;
where  i denotes the set of varieties produced in country i, with mass ni; and where z is a
homogenous good. The parameters  > 1 and 0 < µ < 1 denote the elasticity of substitution
between the varieties of the di erentiated good and consumers’ expenditure share for that good,
respectively. In what follows, we normalize the total mass of varieties produced in each country to
one (ni   1, for i =1 ,2).
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5where pji(v) denotes the price of variety v produced in country j and sold in country i; and where
pz
i is the price of the homogenous good. Given identical and homothetic preferences, Ii stands for
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stands for the CES price index in country i.
Using expressions (1) and (3), as well as the demand for the homogenous good z = (1 µ)Ii/pz
i
ﬁnally yields the representative consumer’s indirect utility as follows
Vi =




i)1 µ Ii (5)
2.2 Technology, transport costs and taxes
We assume that labor is the only factor of production and that it is perfectly mobile across sectors.
All workers in the country have the same unit productivity and, therefore, earn the same wage.
In the homogenous good sector, ﬁrms produce with a constant returns to scale technology using
labor only, and ﬁrms trade their outputs at no cost. This good is produced in both countries at
equilibrium provided L is large enough which we assume from now on. Trade of the homogenous
good then implies that pz
i = p = wz
i = 1 for i =1 ,2, where the last equality reﬂects our choice of
this good as the num´ eraire.
In the di erentiated industry, each ﬁrm produces and sells one ﬁrm-speciﬁc variety v, which
allows us to also use v as a ﬁrm index. Each ﬁrm incurs three types of costs. First, each ﬁrm has
the same unit input requirement, which we normalize to one without loss of generality. Second, it
incurs an ‘iceberg’ (ad-valorem) transport cost  > 1 for shipping the good from the country of
production to the foreign market: for one unit of any variety to arrive at its destination, the ﬁrm
has to ship   units of it. This assumption has become a staple element in international economics
since Krugman (1980). Last, each ﬁrm incurs a cost for distributing its product in each local
market. This cost depends on the variety v and is proportional to the multinational’s sales in each
local market. More formally, variety v is associated with a variety-speciﬁc marketing e ciency
parameter  i(v)   [0,1] such that a share 1   i(v) of each unit of proﬁt made in a market is lost
in the marketing process. Such costs subsume the cost heterogeneity in advertising, marketing,
learning, expertise, retail and distribution, which generally di er across varieties.
Firms have a single production plant and two options for accessing the export market:4
4Note that we do not discuss the ‘proximity-concentration’ trade-o , highlighted in the international trade
61. they can sell their good to a foreign independent distributor who bears the marketing cost
associated with the variety sold. We refer to this case as the exporter structure;
2. they can transfer their good to a fully owned and controlled foreign a liate, who bears the
variety’s marketing cost. We refer to this case as the multinational structure.
Our setup encapsulates the arm’s length principle that is at the core of the OECD transfer pricing
guidelines. The independent distributor in the exporter structure is able to sell the traded good
with an additional mark-up. The exporting ﬁrm must thus balance the ine ciency of independent
distribution (which stems from double marginalization) with its variety-speciﬁc marketing cost
that it would incur if it chooses a multinational structure.
In what follows, we put the superscript x on variables pertaining to exporters, the superscript d
on variables pertaining to distributors, while we put no superscript on those pertaining to multina-
tionals. Let rx
i and ri stand for the transfer prices of exporters and of multinationals, respectively.
We refer to the former as the external transfer price (between exporters and distributors) and to
the latter as the internal transfer price (within multinationals). We denote by xi and mi the mass
of exporters and of multinationals established in country i. By assumption, mi+xi = 1 for i =1 ,2,
so that the total mass of producers satisﬁes m1 + x1 + m2 + x2 = 2.
By contrast to the homogenous good sector, shipping the di erentiated good across countries
is costly. We naturally assume that the same transportation costs are incurred independently of
whether the ﬁrm chooses an exporter or a multinational structure. Yet, in both cases the question
arises as to how ﬁrms will split these transport costs among exporters and distributors, or among
a liates. Note that this question is important in the presence of tax di erences across countries
as the multinational may alleviate its tax burden by imputing a larger share of transport costs to
the a liate located in the high tax country. Put di erently, the split of the transport bill may
serve as a transfer-pricing instrument. In what follows, we denote by  ii   1 the transport costs
borne by the upstream unit (either multinational or exporter) producing the good in country i,
and by  ij   1 the transport costs borne by the downstream unit (either a liate or independent
distributor) marketing the good in country j  = i where it is consumed.5 By deﬁnition of iceberg
transport costs we have  ii ij =   as the full costs must be jointly borne by the upstream and
downstream units.
Insert Figure 1 about here.
literature, where ﬁrms incur additional ﬁxed costs for doing FDI in order to save on variable transport costs. This
trade-o  has been extensively documented elsewhere in the literature (see, e.g., Markusen, 2002; Barba Navaretti
and Venables, 2004).
5We rule out the case where either  ii < 1 or  ij < 1 as this would amount to cross-subsidization by charging
negative transport costs to one unit of the ﬁrm.
7Figure 1 summarizes how the value of production changes as exported goods move from the domes-
tic production unit to the foreign unit, and then to the market. Note that the full transfer price
ri ij represents the total cost borne by the foreign unit (distributor or a liate) in this distribution
chain.
Turning to taxes, all di erentiated ﬁrms pay source-based corporate proﬁts taxes at a rate ti
on proﬁts made in country i.6 Let  i   1   ti denote the ‘after-tax rate of proﬁt’ in country i,
i.e., a gross proﬁt of one dollar yields an after-tax proﬁt of  i dollars that can be distributed to
shareholders. In what follows we assume, without loss of generality, that country 1 is the high-
tax country. Formally,  1 < 2 (i.e., t1 >t 2). Proﬁts are assumed to be distributed to absentee
shareholders. Also, for simplicity, tax revenues are not directly redistributed to consumers. When
taken together, the foregoing assumptions imply that the two countries have the same aggregate
income Ii = wiL = L for i =1 ,2.
3 Exporter structure
We begin by characterizing the choice of exporting ﬁrms. By assumption, the exporting ﬁrm does
not have nexus in the foreign market and must hence rely on an independent distributor who
sells its product there and who bears the marketing cost. Because there is no possibility to write
complete contracts between the two ﬁrms, this arm’s length relationship is not e cient (Grossman
and Hart, 1986). This is because the independent distributor has the right to manage his ﬁrm and
negotiates the price at which he buys the goods from the exporter.
For the sake of clarity let us drop the reference to the variety v and focus on exporters located
in country i, the subsequent results applying to any variety and any country. The timing is as
follows: ﬁrst, the exporter and the independent distributor located in the other country negotiate
an external transfer price rx
i for the good and decide how to impute transport costs among the
exporter and the distributor,  x
ii and  d
ij, with  x
ii d
ij =  ; then, the independent distributor sets
a price px
ij and supplies the good to his local market, whereas the exporter sets the price px
ii at
which she supplies her local market. The relationship between the exporter and the distributor is
speciﬁc and costly to break. As a result, both ﬁrms cannot earn anything outside their established
relationship. 7 The exporter is fully taxed in her country of establishment. Her after-tax proﬁt is
6Keen (1993) argues that the e ective taxation of multinationals is source based, even though tax codes may
stipulate otherwise. This is referred to as the ‘separate entity approach’, i.e., tax authorities treat multinationals’
a liates as separate ﬁrms when determining tax liability (OECD, 2001).
7Independent distributors make irreversible investments in advertising, marketing, and distribution channels.
Exporters sink similar investments on behalf of their distributors. The speciﬁc relationship is also often written
down in, and enforced by, exclusivity contracts that stipulate large penalties in the case of a unilateral separation.
8thus given by  x
i    x




ii    i (p
x
ii   1)q
x
ii i and  
x
ij    i (r
x
i    ii) ijq
x
ij
denote the after-tax proﬁts she makes from sales in her domestic and export markets, respectively;
and where qx
ij   qij(px
ij) for i,j =1 ,2. In this expression, the exporter sells to her distributor
at the external transfer price rx
i . It bears the marketing cost  i (associated with the variety v
produced in country i) at home but not abroad. Exporters and distributors are negligible to the
market and, therefore, take the price indices Pi and Pj as given when setting their optimal prices.
In the second stage, the exporter sets the price px
ii that maximizes her domestic proﬁt  x
ii. This
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i.e., the ﬁrm applies a constant mark-up to unit production costs. Her domestic after-tax proﬁt is
then given by  x
ii =   iP
  1
i  i, where     µL   (    1)
  1 > 0 is a positive bundle of parameters.
Analogously, the independent distributor maximizes his after-tax proﬁt
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ij is the full transfer price he pays to the exporter for each unit that he supplies to the
market; and where qd
ij   qij(pd
ij). This full transfer price includes the transport cost imputed to
the distributor in the destination country. Maximizing (6) with respect to pd












so that the distributor’s and the exporter’s proﬁts are given by
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Note that the independent distributor and the exporter are concerned only with the full transfer
price rx
i  d
ij, which thus becomes the unique decision variable to negotiate on.
In the ﬁrst stage, we assume a Nash bargaining process, where 0 <   < 1 stands for the
distributor’s bargaining power. The transfer price and the transport cost imputation maximize




    
 x
ij
 1  , where the price indices Pi for i =1 ,2 are taken as given.
This product is a function of the full transfer price rx
i  d
ij, which implies that the imputation of
transport costs has no impact on the bargaining outcome. In other words, any change in the
imputation of transport costs results in an equal opposite change in the equilibrium transfer price.
This yields our ﬁrst result, namely that exporters are indi erent to the imputation of the transport
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9The parameter   is a measure of the ine ciency of the arm’s length relationship in the exporter
structure. It measures the mark-up over the marginal cost   that the exporter includes in her
external transfer price. The transfer price and the market price are then equal to:
r
x
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  . (9)
There is obviously a double marginalization issue as the exporter and the independent distributor
do not internalize the impact of their pricing decisions on each other’s proﬁt. This issue becomes
less severe as the bargaining power of the distributor increases: the full transfer price rx
i  d
ij is equal
to the cost   of serving the export market when the independent distributor has all bargaining
power (  = 1). In this case, he decides on both the external transfer price and the consumer price.
Using expressions (9), the exporter’s after-tax proﬁt can be decomposed into its domestic and
foreign parts as follows:
 
x
ii =   iP
  1
i  i and  
x
ij =   iP
  1
j  
1   , (10)
where        (  1)(  1)   (0,1/e) and where e   2.71828...is Euler’s number. The parameter
  captures the disadvantage of serving the foreign market through an independent distributor. It
increases with   and falls with  .
Let us summarize the foregoing results as follows.
Proposition 1 (i) Exporters are indi erent to the imputation of transport costs. (ii) Exporters
incur a cost because of the ine ciency of their arm’s length relationship with the independent
distributor.
Although speciﬁc to the Dixit-Stiglitz model with iceberg transport costs, the ﬁrst result is impor-
tant as this model is a natural benchmark in international economics. It dispells any ambiguity
about the imputation of transport costs and eases the subsequent analysis about ﬁrms’ organiza-
tional choices and consumers’ beneﬁts.
4 Multinational structure
Contrary to exporters, multinationals can shift proﬁts between their units using internal transfer
prices. They can also minimize their tax liability using an appropriate imputation of transport
costs across their units. By integrating their upstream and downstream activities across countries,
multinationals also avoid the ine ciencies of arm’s length relationships with an independent dis-
tributor since the multinational retains the full control over its consumer prices. By contrast, the
multinational has to incur itself the marketing cost.
10We focus on a multinational v producing in country i, and we again suppress the variety
index v. Variables pertaining to multinationals carry no superscripts. The multinational sets
its domestic and foreign product prices pii and pij, its internal transfer price ri and its domestic
and foreign imputation of transport costs,  ii and  ij where  ii ij =  . Sales of pijqij dollars
in the foreign market require to supply the foreign unit with a value of  ijpijqij dollars and to
produce domestically for a value of  ii ijpijqij dollars. Internal shipments are given an accounting
value of ri ijpijqij dollars. All values are deﬂated by the variety-speciﬁc marketing parameter  i.
Therefore, the multinational’s proﬁt includes three terms: (i) the proﬁt from domestic sales taxed
at the domestic rate
 ii    i (pii   1)qii i; (11)
(ii) the proﬁt declared by the foreign a liate taxed at the foreign rate
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ij    j (pijqij   ri ijqij) i; (12)




ij    i (ri ijqij    ii ijqij) i. (13)
Expressions (12) and (13) can be added to give the after-tax proﬁts from foreign sales
 ij    
for
ij +  
dom
ij =  j (pij   Ri)qij i (14)
where qii   qii(pii) and qij   qij(pij); and where
Ri   ri ij  
 i
 j
(ri ij    ) (15)
measures the multinational’s tax-adjusted marginal cost of serving the foreign market.8 Note that
expression (15) shows that the tax-adjusted marginal cost is a convex combination of the multina-
tional’s marginal cost and the full transfer price. As in the exporter structure, the multinational
only cares about the full transfer price ri ij. However, in contrast to an exporter, the multinational
may not be allowed to freely set its internal transfer price ri because of restrictions imposed by the
tax authorities. Hence, the imputation of transport costs is a priori ambiguous and may depend
on transfer pricing rules. Finally, the multinational’s total proﬁt is given by  i    ii +  ij.
We now analyze the multinational’s pricing decisions under various transfer pricing rules. First,
we analyze the two benchmark cases of perfect audit and no audit, where tax authorities are able
either to acquire full information on true production costs or no information at all, respectively.
8By analogy with Hyde and Choe’s (2005) double accounting system, where ﬁrms keep two sets of books, Ri is
the cost accounting ﬁgure used for managerial incentive purposes whereas ri is the ﬁscal accounting ﬁgure used for
tax purposes.
11Then, we analyze the pricing decisions of the multinational under the two transfer pricing rules
of comparable uncontrolled pricing (CUP) and cost-plus. We assume that multinationals comply
with the transfer prices enforced by tax authorities whenever the latter do decide on a particular
rule. Put di erently, we disregard the issues of non-compliance and penalties that tax authorities
may impose (see, e.g., Hyde and Choe, 2005; Choe and Hyde, 2007).
4.1 Perfect audit
Suppose that tax authorities are able to acquire perfect information about the cost  ii at which
the multinational supplies the good to her foreign unit, and impose the constraint ri =  ii on the
multinational’s transfer price. Under this transfer pricing rule, the multinational’s imputation of
its transport cost does not a ect her full transfer price ri ij and hence her tax-adjusted marginal
cost Ri, which are both constant and equal to  . Hence, the imputation of transport costs does
not a ect prices and proﬁts.
More speciﬁcally, the multinational producing in country i chooses pii and pij to maximize her
proﬁt, given by
 i =  i(pii   1)qii i +  j(pij    )qij i.
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 , (16)
where we use the superscript o for the perfect audit case. Her proﬁts from the domestic and foreign
sales are given by
 
o
ii =   iP
  1
i  i and  
o
ij =   jP
  1
j  
1   i. (17)
4.2 No audit
Suppose now that tax authorities are unable to acquire information about the multinational’s costs
and to impose any transfer price. Unconstrained multinationals are however willing to declare losses
to claim tax credits in the high tax country 1. Yet, no tax authority will indeﬁnitely grant tax
credits to multinationals which repeatedly declare losses. In our static model, this means that tax
authorities constrain the multinationals to declare non-negative proﬁts in their jurisdiction.
The multinational ﬁnds the prices pii and pij, the transfer price ri and the transport cost
imputation  ii and  ij that maximize its total proﬁt  i subject to the constaints  ii+ dom
ij   0 and
 for
ij   0. As expected, the multinational shifts all the proﬁts generated in the high tax country to
the low tax country, and sets the same prices as those it would set in the absence of taxes (see the
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 , (18)
12where the superscript   stands for the no audit case. Since those prices are independent of  ii and
 ij, the multinational is indi erent as to the imputation of its transport costs. Because the tax is
lower in country 2, the after-tax proﬁts in each market are given by
 
 
ii =   2P
  1
i  i and  
 
ij =   2P
  1
j  
1   i. (19)
The two benchmark cases of perfect audit and no audit are hardly realistic as they assume
either a too myopic or a too sophisticated behavior on behalf of tax authorities. Tax authorities do
realize that ﬁrms can use transfer prices to shift proﬁts and therefore use various transfer pricing
rules to constrain the ﬁrms. We now examine in more detail the two most frequently used rules
which are recommended by the OECD.
4.3 Comparable uncontrolled price
The most widely used transfer pricing rule recommended by the OECD is the Comparable Uncon-
trolled Price (henceforth, CUP). Under CUP, the tax authorities constrain the multinationals to
set their transfer prices to the price of a comparable uncontrolled transaction with an independent
ﬁrm (the so-called arm’s length principle). According to the OECD (2001, Chap. II-2.11), “the
CUP method is a particularly reliable method where an independent entreprise sells the same
product as is sold between two associated enterprises.” However, comparing di erent transactions
is not easy. The OECD recognizes that particular care should be taken for the accounting of
transport costs and of product di erentiation (OECD, 2001, Chap. II-2.15–2.19).
Since varieties are symmetric in our model, a valid basis for price comparisons is given by the
prices prevailing in the relationship between the exporter in country i and the independent distrib-
utor in country j. The tax authority observes the total cost borne by the independent distributor
for each unit it sells which, by (8), is equal to rx
i  d
ij =   . This is precisely the comparable un-
controlled price that the tax authorities impose on transactions within the multinationals. Hence,
under the CUP rule, the transfer prices of multinationals producing in country i are restricted,
such that




ij =       ri =   ii,
where we have used the identity  ii ij =  . As in the case of no audit, multinational a liates may
end up declaring permanent losses by setting their sales price pij below their full transfer price
ri ij. Thus, to avoid perpetual tax credits, tax authorities impose pij   ri ij so that  for
ij   0.9
Suppose ﬁrst that multinationals have no incentives to declare losses in their foreign market.
Using (15), the tax-adjusted marginal cost of serving the foreign market is given by
Ri =  
 
   
 i
 j
(    1)
 
9Multinationals declare positive proﬁts in their country of production,  ii +  dom
ii > 0, because ri ij =       .
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Ri, (20)
where superscript c denotes the variables under the CUP rule. The multinationals have no incen-
tives to declare losses when pij   ri ij, which is equivalent to
 j
 i
     , where      
 (    1)
 
=
 (1    )
     
  (0,1). (21)
The above inequality is always satisﬁed for multinationals producing in the high tax country i =1
because  2/ 1   1. It is satisﬁed for multinationals producing in the low tax country i = 2 if and
only if  1/ 2      .
Two points are worth noting. First, under CUP, the multinational is indi erent as to the
imputation  ii and  ij of transport costs. This is because multinationals only care about the full
transfer price ri ij, which is exactly the comparable uncontrolled price that the tax authorities
observe from the relationship between exporters and distributors. Any change in the transport
cost imputation is o set by a change in the transfer price.
Second, the CUP transfer price is a ected by the ine ciency existing in the arm’s length re-
lationship between exporters and distributors, since the latter is used as a point of comparison.
A larger ine ciency   translates into a higher transfer price ri, which itself makes tax-adjusted
marginal costs diverge: R1       R2. The upward bias on the transfer price is not proﬁtable
for the multinationals that produce in the high tax country 1 and that want to shift proﬁts into
the other country. Because R1    , those multinationals have incentives to reduce their domestic
tax base by reducing their shipments to the foreign market and to increase their foreign tax base
by selling at a higher price there. Conversely, the upward bias on the transfer price is proﬁtable
for the multinationals that produce in the low tax country 2 and that want to shift proﬁts into
that country. Because R2    , those multinationals have incentives to expand their domestic tax
base by increasing their shipments to the foreign market and by reducing their foreign tax base by
selling at a lower price there. Hence, the CUP transfer prices yield under-production by the multi-
nationals producing in the high tax country; and over-production by the multinationals producing
in the low tax country.
The proﬁts generated in each market are given by
 
c
ii =   iP
  1
i  i and  
c




i  i if  j/ i      . (22)
Suppose ﬁnally that multinationals have incentives to declare losses in their foreign market.
This happens for multinationals producing in the low tax country 2 when  1/ 2 <    . The tax
authority in the high tax country 1 constrains those multinationals to erase their permanent losses
by setting p21 = r2 21, and imposes the full transfer price r2 21 =   . Because the latter price
14is independent of the transport cost imputation  22 and  21, multinationals are again indi erent
with regard to that imputation. One can verify that p21 is smaller than the corresponding price
under perfect audit and under no audit, i.e., the ﬁrm has an incentive to produce too much. At
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  2 if  1/ 2 <    . (23)
4.4 Cost plus
The second most widely used transfer pricing rule recommended by the OECD is the Cost Plus
rule (henceforth, CP). Under CP, the tax authorities compute the transfer price by applying an
‘appropriate’ margin to the cost of multinationals. The OECD (2001, Chap. II-11) recommends
that “an appropriate mark-up is [...] added to [the multinational’s] cost, to make an appropriate
proﬁt in the light of functions performed and the market conditions.” The tax authorities have
several ways to estimate what is an ‘appropriate margin’, depending on their information about
the technology and the market conditions of the industry. In most cases, the tax authorities ask
for a succinct industry survey in the country where the multinational produces to obtain a rough
estimate of the mark-ups in that industry.
Let the tax authorities in country i deﬁne the ‘appropriate’ margin using the aggregate measure
 i   si
ri    ii
 ii
+ (1   si)
rx





where the mark-ups contain the transfer prices ri and the production plus transport costs  ii borne
by the multinational producer established in country i; and where 0 <s i < 1 and 1   si are the
weights put on multinationals’ and exporters’ mark-ups, respectively. For example, the weight on
multinationals’ mark-ups is equal to si = mi/(mi + xi) if the tax authorities weight mark-ups by
the mass of ﬁrms; whereas it is equal to si = miqc
i/(miqc
i + xiqx
i ) if it weights mark-ups by output
volumes.
We ﬁrst consider a multinational that produces in the high tax country 1 and that wants to
shift proﬁts into the low tax country 2 by using a low transfer price r1. Since the low tax country
always gains from multinationals’ tax avoidance, this country does not impose restrictions on the
multinational’s transfer price. We thus just need to study the behavior of the tax authorities in
the high tax country 1. Under the CP rule, the tax authorities in the high tax country use  1 as
a lower bound on the mark-ups of domestic multinationals:
 1  
r1    11
 11
   r1    11(1 +  1). (25)
This constraint prevents ﬁrms from shifting too much proﬁt by transferring the good at too low
a price. Consider next a multinational that produces in the low tax country 2 and that wants to
15shift proﬁts to its domestic production unit through a high transfer price. The tax authorities use
 2 as an upper bound on the mark-ups so that
 2  
r2    22
 22
   r2    22(1 +  2). (26)
We now compute the ‘appropriate’ margins  1 and  2 consistent with equilibrium. The ‘ap-
propriate’ margins depend on transfer prices, while transfer prices depend on the constraints on
the ‘appropriate’ margins. In equilibrium, those constraints must be consistent with the transfer
prices. Let us ﬁrst suppose that multinationals have no incentive to declare perpetual losses. They
set their transfer prices so that the foregoing constraints on ‘appropriate’ margins are binding. The
equilibrium is readily computed by replacing (ri    ii)/ ii by  i in expression (24) and by using rx
i
as deﬁned by (9). We successively get






ij    
 x
ii
= si i + (1   si)(    1),i =1 ,2,
which reduces to  i =   1. As a result, the weighting scheme used for computing the ‘appropriate’
margin is immaterial for the equilibrium value of this margin. Furthermore, using the binding
constraints (25) and (26), we obtain the transfer price under CP given by
ri =   ii.
Hence, multinationals are imposed the same constraint under CUP and CP transfer pricing rules,
so that their total proﬁts are the same. The two main results pertaining to CUP apply to CP:
(i) multinationals are indi erent as to the imputation of transport costs and (ii) transfer prices
are a ected by the ine ciency existing in the arm’s length relationship between exporters and
independent distributors. As under the CUP transfer pricing rule, multinationals producing in
the low tax country 2 have incentives to declare perpetual losses in their foreign market when
 1/ 2 <    . Since they are not allowed to declare losses, the multinationals set their break-even
price p21 = r2 21. It can be shown that CUP and CP remain equivalent when  1/ 2 <    .
4.5 Summary and discussion
The foregoing sections provide a simple answer to the question about the impact of international
tax di erentials on ﬁrms’ imputation of transport costs: tax di erentials do not matter for that
imputation. Furthermore, they also give a simple answer to the question about the possible dif-
ferences between CUP and CP transfer pricing rules: there are no di erences in our model. Our
foregoing results on the multinationals’ pricing decisions may be summarized as follows:
Proposition 2 (i) Multinationals are indi erent as to the imputation of transport costs under
perfect audit, no audit, CUP and CP transfer pricing rules. (ii) CUP and CP transfer pricing
16rules are equivalent. Prices, production incentives and proﬁts are the same under both rules, and
the transfer prices reﬂect the ine ciency existing in the arm’s length relationship. (iii) Compared
to the perfect audit and no audit cases, multinationals producing in the high tax country ship too
little to their export market, whereas multinationals producing in the low tax country ship too much
to their export market.
Note that the ine ciency with CUP and CP transfer pricing is related to the additional mark-up
that is present in the arm’s length relationship between exporters and independent distributors.
The transfer prices are thus above the ‘technological cost’   of serving foreign markets. This
ine ciency decreases when product varieties become better substitutes. Indeed,   falls as   rises.
In the limit,     1 when      , in which case the ine ciency entirely vanishes. More formally:
Corollary 1 When products are close to perfect substitutes (     ), the CUP and CP transfer
pricing rules yield the same transfer prices as under perfect audit.
Corollary 1 provides an economic rationale for the OECD guidelines. However, it also prompts us
to be careful. Firstly, the CUP and CP rules only converge to the perfect audit case in the limit
of a perfectly competitive industry; those rules yield quite di erent outcomes otherwise. Secondly,
at this competitive limit, proﬁts tend to zero so that taxation and the choice of a transfer pricing
rule become irrelevant issues. Finally, even very small proﬁts can still be ranked under di erent
organizational structures. Hence, ﬁrms may not choose the same structure under the di erent
transfer pricing rules even when goods are very close substitutes. We will turn to this issue in the
next section by examining more closely ﬁrms’ organizational structure.
5 Choice of organizational structure
We now turn to the ﬁrms’ choices of organizational structure. Recall that a ﬁrm can either
export its goods by relying on an independent distributor in the foreign market, or it can become a
multinational operating a fully owned foreign a liate. Ine ciencies in the arm’s length relationship
with the distributor as well as tax considerations provide incentives for ‘going multinational’.
In what follows, to isolate the ‘pure’ e ects of transfer pricing rules on ﬁrms’ organizational
choices, we remove compositional e ects by assuming that each country has the same ﬁrm distri-
bution. More speciﬁcally, we assume that in each country the variety-speciﬁc e ciency parameters
 i(v) are distributed according to the cdf F ( ) : [0,1]   [0,1] and F   > 0. Hence F is simply the
inverse of  i. In each country i, a ﬁrm v with  i(v) chooses to operate a multinational structure
if doing so yields higher proﬁts than being an exporter:
 ii +  ij    
x
ii +  
x
ij (27)
17Note that the multinational’s proﬁt on foreign sales  ij depends on its e ciency parameter  i(v),
whereas its revenue from sales to the distributor  x
ij does not depend on it (as the distributor bears
the distribution costs).
We ﬁrst analyze the choice of organizational structure in the perfect audit and in the no audit
benchmark cases. We then turn to the OECD rules and ﬁnally compare the di erent cases.
5.1 Perfect audit
When the tax authorities can perfectly monitor the multinationals, they apply a transfer price
equal to  . Each ﬁrm compares its proﬁts as a multinational (17) with its proﬁts as an exporter
(10). A ﬁrm v producing in country i chooses a multinational structure if its variety-speciﬁc







whereas it chooses an exporter structure otherwise. Country i hence hosts a mass of exporters
F( o
i) and a mass of multinationals 1   F( o
i). Two comments are in order. First, although tax
authorities are able to impose the ‘right’ transfer price, they cannot correct the ine ciencies in the
arm’s length relationship between exporters and distributors. Larger ine ciencies imply a smaller
value of  , which reduces the thresholds  o
i and yields fewer exporters in both countries. Second,
since  1 < 2, we have 0 < o
1 <   <  o
2. The mass of multinationals in the high tax country
1 F( o
1) therefore exceeds the mass of multinationals in the low tax country 1 F( o
2). Compared
to exporters, multinationals pay more taxes on the proﬁts made in the high tax country 1. By
contrast, exporters can repatriate some of those proﬁts through the mark-ups that they negotiate
with the independent distributors. Hence, ﬁrms producing in the low tax country 2 have smaller
incentives to adopt a multinational structure. In contrast, ﬁrms producing in the high tax country
1 prefer a multinational structure because all their foreign proﬁts generated in the low tax country
are taxed there.
5.2 No audit
Suppose next that tax authorities are unable to acquire information about the multinationals’
costs and do, therefore, not impose any transfer price. Multinationals can then shift all their
proﬁts to the low tax country 2 and are thus fully taxed at the lowest rate. The trade-o  between
an exporter structure and a multinational structure is clear for the ﬁrms producing in the low
tax country 2. Since multinationals and exporters are taxed at the same rate there, taxation is
irrelevant to their choice which is only driven by the trade-o  between the ine ciencies in the arm’s
length relationship and the variety-speciﬁc marketing ine ciency they incur as a multinational.
18Comparing expressions (10) and (19) reveals that a ﬁrm v producing in the high tax country
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Conversely, the ﬁrms producing in the high tax country 1 face a slightly di erent trade-o  because
their proﬁts in each market are taxed di erently depending on their choice of structure. Comparing
expressions (10) and (19) reveals that a ﬁrm v chooses the multinational structure if and only if
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Since  1 < 2, we have   
1 <  
2. Hence, ﬁrms producing in the high tax country 1 also have larger
incentives to adopt a multinational structure. The mass of multinationals producing in the high
tax country 1 F(  
1) indeed exceeds the mass of multinationals producing in the low tax country
1 F(  
2). Observe that the multinationals producing in country 1 can avoid the taxes that country
1 exporters must pay on the proﬁt generated by foreign sales. In contrast, the multinationals
producing in country 2 cannot avoid such taxes. They can only alleviate the ine ciency arising in
the arm’s length relationship. Their incentives to go multinational are therefore weaker.
Having analyzed the two benchmark cases, we now turn to the impact of the OECD transfer
pricing rules on ﬁrms’ organizational choices.
5.3 OECD transfer pricing rules
As shown by Proposition 2, ﬁrms make the same pricing and output choices under CUP and CP
transfer pricing rules. We may hence restrict our analysis to the CUP rule. Recall from Subsection
4.3 that if  j/ i >    , the tax authorities impose the transfer price ri =   ii to multinationals
producing in i. Comparing expression (10) and (22) reveals that a ﬁrm v producing in country
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. (28)
Observe that (28) is a ected by both the tax di erential and by the ine ciency in the arm’s length
relationship between exporters and distributors. Because  1 < 2, expression (28) always applies
to ﬁrms producing in the high tax country i = 1, where it applies to ﬁrms producing in the low
tax country i = 2 only if the tax di erential is small enough ( 1/ 2 >    ). For a large enough tax
di erential ( 1/ 2 >    ), multinationals producing in country 2 are constrained to report no losses.
19Their proﬁts under a multinational structure (23) then exceed their proﬁts under an exporter
structure (10) if  2(v) is larger then








We can now compare the ﬁrms’ organizational choices in both countries. One can readily
verify that  c
1 <   <  c
2      c
2. Consequently, ﬁrms producing in the low tax country 2 have smaller
incentives to adopt a multinational structure so that the mass of multinationals producing in the
low tax country 1   F( c
2) is smaller than the mass of multinationals producing in the high tax
country 1   F( c
1). This conclusion concurs with the two benchmark cases.
It is instructive to compare the OECD rules with the perfect audit case by re-writing expression
(28) as  c
i =  o
i (Ri/ )
  1. The incentives for going multinational are thus similar to the perfect
audit case safe for a corrective term including the tax-adjusted marginal cost Ri of serving the
foreign market. On the one hand, this tax-adjusted marginal cost exceeds   for multinationals
producing in the high tax country 1, thus implying that  c
1 > o
1. Put di erently, the ﬁrms
producing in the high tax country 1 have less incentives to choose a multinational structure than
under perfect audit. The reason is that the CUP transfer price is too large and therefore forces
the multinational to shift too much proﬁt into her a liate producing in the high tax country 1.
Although those multinationals minimize this loss by under-producing for the foreign market, they
still see their proﬁts fall, thus making them worse o  than under perfect audit. Conversely, for
multinationals producing in the low tax country 2, R2 < , which implies that  c
2 < o
2. Hence, the
ﬁrms producing in the low tax country 2 have larger incentives to choose a multinational structure
than under perfect audit. The reason is that the larger CUP transfer price enables these ﬁrms to
shift proﬁts to the low tax country 1 by over-producing for the foreign market, which is beneﬁcial
to them.
Insert Figure 2 about here.
Firms’ organizational choices are summarized by Figure 2, which depicts the loci of the above
thresholds under perfect audit (o), no audit ( ), as well as CUP and CP transfer pricing rules
(c). In each case, the vertical distance of   from the x-axis measures the mass of exporters
F( ), whereas the vertical distance between   and the top of the ﬁgure measures the mass of
multinationals 1   F( ). Some computations, using the foregoing results, allow us to rank the














We can furthermore show that the thresholds (  
1, o
1, c
1) are increasing functions of the tax di er-
ential  1/ 2, whereas the thresholds ( c
2, o
2) are decreasing functions of it. Note that all thresholds
20tend to   as the tax di erential vanishes ( 1/ 2   1). In other words, when tax di erences are very
small, ﬁrms’ organizational choices solely reﬂect the trade-o  between the ine ciency in the arm’s
length relationship between exporters and distributors and the variety-speciﬁc marketing ine -
ciency of multinationals. When tax di erentials get larger ( 1/ 2 decreases), the ﬁrms producing
in the high tax country 1 have larger incentives to choose the multinational structure, whereas
those producing in the low tax country 2 have larger incentives to choose the exporter structure.
Hence, the ﬁrms’ organizational incentives diverge across countries as tax di erences grow larger.
Let us summarize the foregoing results as follows.
Proposition 3 (i) Firms’ incentives to choose a multinational structure are always larger in the
high tax country ( k
1 < k
2, for k = o, ,c). (ii) In the high tax country, the incentives to choose
a multinational structure are always lower under CUP and CP than under perfect audit and no
audit (  
1 < o
1 < c
1). (iii) Firms’ incentives to choose a multinational structure in the low tax




incentives diverge as tax di erences increase (i.e., as  1/ 2 decreases).
Note that the foregoing results also hold when products become close to perfect substitutes (i.e.,
     ). Despite the equivalence of transfer prices shown in Corollary 1, the proﬁts made by the
ﬁrms under the di erent transfer pricing rules are not the same, so that ﬁrms are not indi erent
as to their organizational structure. We summarize this result in the following corollary.
Corollary 2 When products are close to perfect substitutes (     ), the mass of ﬁrms choosing
a multinational structure under CUP and CP does not converge to their mass under full audit.
The ranking (29) continues to apply.
Having characterized ﬁrms’ organizational choices under the di erent transfer pricing rules, we
now investigate the e ciency properties of those choices. In so doing, we will focus on consumer’s
utility as this is an aspect that is usually disregarded in the discussion on the desirability of the
design of transfer prices.
6 Consumer’s utility
The OECD transfer pricing rules are designed to help tax authorities and multinationals to ﬁnd
mutually satisfying solutions to transfer pricing disputes, thereby minimizing conﬂict and costly
litigation. Those rules are also presented as a means to achieve the OECD’s objectives: to promote
a high standard of living and the e cient use of economic resources. In the hypothetical context
of perfect competition, transfer pricing rules should help tax authorities to assess the true transfer
prices and to alleviate market distortions generated by tax di erentials across countries. Transfer
21pricing rules do, however, no longer achieve these goals in the context of imperfect competition
when ﬁrms’ prices and organizational structures di er from the e cient ones. In such a case, some
consumers may loose from transfer pricing rules, while others may gain. The literature on transfer
pricing has predominantly focused on tax revenue and production e ciency. Less attention has
been devoted to how transfer pricing rules a ect the ‘standard of living’, i.e., consumers’ utility.
This is the focus of this section. To ease the presentation, we restrict our analysis to the case of
su ciently small tax di erentials, i.e.,  1/ 2 >     as deﬁned in (21). This restriction concurs with
the OECD case where corporate proﬁts tax di erentials rarely exceed 40%.
Let r = o, ,c denote the di erent transfer pricing rules (no audit, full audit, or the OECD
rules). The consumer’s utility (5) is an increasing function of the CES price index
P
1  
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. (30)
Using the foregoing results of Sections 3 and 4, we know that pr
ii =  /(    1) and that px
ji =
   /(   1), both of which are independent of the transfert pricing rules, the location of multina-
tionals, and the location of consumers. Hence, the ﬁrst bracket in expression (30) is constant. A
transfer pricing rule r has two e ects on consumer’s utility in country i. First, there is an e ect at
the intensive margin through their impact on foreign multinationals’ prices pr
ji for serving market
i. Second, there is an e ect at the extensive margin through their impact on the mass of foreign
multinationals mj. We study each of those e ects in turn.
Intensive margin. Expressions (9), (16), (18) and (20) allow us to rank the sales prices in the











ij,  i,j and i  = j. (31)
Observe that the highest prices px
ij are always set by the independent distributors, which is due to
the double marginalization arising in the arm’s lenght relationship. The lowest prices pc
21 are set
by the multinationals that ship from the low tax country 2 to the high tax country 1 under the
OECD rules. Since their transfer prices exceed their marginal costs, those ﬁrms cut their prices to
inﬂate their shipments to the high tax country which allows them to transfer back proﬁts into the
low tax country. By contrast, the multinationals shipping from the high tax country 1 set a high
sales price pc
12 in the foreign market in order to inﬂate their foreign proﬁts and beneﬁt from the
low tax rate there.
As the tax di erential between countries 1 and 2 widens ( 1/ 2 decreases), the gap in multi-
nationals’ sales prices also widens across countries, which provides a consumption advantage to
country 1 because its imports get cheaper (pc
21 <p c
12). This advantage is magniﬁed by larger
tax di erences. Hence, for a given industry structure, the high tax country has access to cheaper
22products under OECD rules. To clarify this point, let us study the intensive margin by focusing
on the ﬁrms’ structure in the absence of tax di erential. In that case, since mr
1 = mr
2 =1  F( ),
the mass of exporters remains constant and consumers’ utility only depends inversely on multi-
nationals’ sales prices. Because px
ji >p r











Hence, as tax di erentials increase, prices and consumers’ utility remain the same under perfect
audit and under no audit; whereas prices and consumers’ utility diverge under OECD rules. In the
latter case, this provides a consumption advantage (resp., disadvantage) to the high (resp., low)
tax country.
Extensive margin. Transfer pricing rules have extensive margin e ects since they inﬂuence
ﬁrms’ organizational structure. Because the mass of multinationals mr
i is equal to 1   F( r
i), we














In words, the high tax country 1 has the largest mass of multinationals under perfect audit while
the low tax country 2 has the lowest mass under no audit. As can be seen from Figure 2, ﬁrms’
structures diverge as tax di erentials increase: more ﬁrms choose to become multinationals in
the high tax country 1 and more ﬁrms choose the exporter structure in the low tax country 2.
Thus, for given prices, the high tax country is served by more exporters through independent
distributors whereas the low tax country is served by more multinationals through their a liates.
Because independent distributors set the highest prices, consumers in the high tax country lose
while those in the low tax country gain. To clarify this point, let us again look at the case without
tax di erences (in which case pr
ij = po
ij = p 
ij =    (   1)). Because consumers’ utility in country














Firms’ organizational choices bestow a consumption disadvantage (resp., advantage) upon con-
sumers residing in the high (resp., low) tax country. One can show that the extensive margin
e ect is stronger for larger tax di erentials. Nevertheless, this e ect goes in the opposite direction
of the intensive margin e ect, so that the combined e ect is a priori unclear.
Combined margins. We ﬁrst study the cross-country di erences in consumers’ utility for a
given transfer pricing rule. Because there is no intensive margin e ect under either perfect audit










23Hence, consumers’ utility is lower in the high tax country 1 because more ﬁrms choose an exporter
structure in other country to escape taxation and, therefore, increase the number of distributors
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(32)
which is independent of transport costs   because Ri is proportional to  . Since the two sides
of this inequality are smaller than one, it does not generally hold. Nevertheless, as shown in the
Appendix, this condition is always satisﬁed when tax di erentials are small ( 1/ 2   1) and when
the distribution F is uniform, F( )= . Under those conditions, the intensive margin e ect
dominates the extensive margin e ect: consumers are better o  in the high tax country 1 because
they beneﬁt more from the cheaper imports from their foreign multinationals than they lose from
the increased presence of distributors who charge higher prices.
Proposition 4 (i) Consumers’ utility is lower in the high tax country than in the low tax country
under perfect audit and no audit. (ii) The opposite result holds true under OECD rules for small tax
di erences and for a uniform distribution of the e ciency parameters  i. (iii) The cross-country
gap in consumers’ utility widens as tax di erentials increase.
Last, we study the di erences in consumers’ utility between di erent transfer pricing rules. A
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(33)
As is the case with (32), the latter inequality does not depend on   because Ri is proportional
to  . Yet, it cannot be clearly signed without some additional assumptions. As before, we can
show that this inequality is always satisﬁed when tax di erences are small and in the case of a
uniform distribution of  i. We can summarize those results, taking the no audit case as a natural
benchmark, as follows.
24Proposition 5 (i) Consumers’ utility falls in both countries when tax authorities switch from no
audit to perfect audit. (ii) Consumers’ utility falls even more in the low tax country, but it increases
in the high tax country, when tax authorities switch from no audit to OECD rules, provided that
tax di erences are small and that the distribution of the e ciency parameters  i is uniform.
When tax authorities switch from no audit to perfect audit, more ﬁrms choose a multinational
structure to avoid taxation. Consequently, there are less ine cient exporter-distributor arm’s
length relationships. Since multinationals do not distort their prices under perfect audit, prices
fall on average. By contrast, when tax authorities switch from no audit to OECD rules, consumers
are better o  in the high tax country 1 because they beneﬁt from lower prices set by multinationals
producing in the foreign country. In the low tax country 2, consumers are worse o  because foreign
multinationals inﬂate their prices there and reduce quantities shipped to beneﬁt from the low tax
rates.
7 Conclusions
We have developed a monopolistic competition model that analyzes the impacts of OECD trans-
fer pricing rules on ﬁrms’ market decisions, their organizational choices, and consumers’ utility.
Multinationals compete with exporters, and the arm’s length relationships between exporters and
independent distributors serve as a natural benchmark for tax authorities to gauge the multina-
tionals’ proﬁt shifting behavior.
Using as benchmarks the cases where the tax authorities are either unable to audit the multina-
tionals or are able to audit them perfectly, we have shown that the Comparable Uncontrolled Price
and the Cost-Plus method suggested by the OECD are equivalent. In the high tax country, the
incentives to operate a multinational structure with fully owned and controlled a liates are lower
than under both benchmarks when OECD rules are enforced. Firms are thus more likely to adopt
an exporter structure using an independent distributor, which directly a ects the market outcome
because of ine cient double marginalization. In the low tax country, the incentives to operate a
multinational structure with fully owned and controlled a liates lie somewhere in between the two
benchmarks. We may thus conclude that the choice of a transfer pricing rule has a direct impact
on ﬁrms’ decisions as to how to serve foreign markets.
When markets are not competitive, the multinationals’ transfer prices are not constrained to be
e cient market prices even under OECD rules. Instead, the ‘appropriate margin’ or the ‘compa-
rable uncontrolled price’ are too high because of double marginalization arising in the comparable
transaction between exporters and independent distributors. This gives rise to production ine -
ciencies which a ect consumers’ utility. We show that consumers’ utility in the low tax country
is highest in the no-audit case. The reason is that multinationals set lower prices than the local
25independent distributors who contract with exporting ﬁrms, and that the incentives to operate a
multinational structure are largest when there is no audit. By constrast, in the high tax country
OECD rules impose a lower marginal cost to foreign ﬁrms serving that market, thus translating
into a price advantage for consumers. Thus, consumers’ utility is higher under OECD rules than
under no-audit. Finally, it is worth noting that perfect audit is never the optimal policy for any of
the two countries. Indeed, given the price advantage of multinationals vis-` a-vis exporters, a too
restrictive transfer pricing policy may entice an excessive number of ﬁrms to operate as exporters,
thereby harming consumers. This result suggests that consumers’ welfare should be taken into
consideration when evaluating the desirability of a given transfer pricing policy.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2. Under no audit, a multinational producing in country i ﬁnds the
transfer price ri, the imputation of transport cost  ii and  ij, and the local and export prices pii
and pij that maximize her total proﬁt
 i =  i
 












subject to the constraint that she cannot declare permanent losses in any country:
 ii +  
dom
ij =( pii   1)qii i +( ri    ii) i
 
 ii









 iqij   0.
28A marginal increase in ri increases total proﬁt if and only if d i/dri =(  i    j)( / ii) iqij   0
which holds true if and only if  i    j. Hence the optimal transfer price is always a corner solution
that makes one of the constraints binding. Assume ﬁrst that i = 1, so that  i  j < 0. In this case,
 ii +  dom
ij = 0, and the transfer price becomes r 
1 =  11   (p11   1)(q11/q12)( 11/ ). Plugging r 
1 in
the total proﬁt yields  1 =  for
12 =  2 [(p11   1)q11 +( p12    )q12] 1, which is independent of the
imputation  11 and  12 of transport costs. The optimal prices are thus equal to p 
11 =  /(    1)
and p 
12 =   /(    1) as given in Section 4.2. Assume next that i = 2, so that  i    j > 0.
In this case,  for
21 = 0 so that the transfer price is constrained to r 
2 = p22 22/ . The ﬁrm’s total
proﬁt becomes  2 =  22 +  dom
21 =  2 [(p22   1)q22 +( p21    )q21] 2, which is also independent of
the transport cost imputation. The optimal prices are thus also equal to p 
22 =  /(    1) and
p 
21 =   /(    1).  
Proof of Proposition 3. We need to rank the thresholds  i and we need to assess their changes
with respect to changes in tax di erentials. Let      1/ 2 < 1. We may then rewrite the
thresholds as follows:  o
1 =   ,  o
2 =    1,   
1 =      (1    )(P1/P2)
  1    1,   
2 =  ,  c
1 =
  (     (    1))
  1 and  c
2 =    1 (      1(    1))
  1.
(i) We ﬁrst show how the threshold  i varies with  . It is readily veriﬁed that d o
1/d  > 0 and
d o
2/d  < 0. Furthermore, d  
1/d  =   +( P1/P2)
  1    1 > 0 whereas d  
2/d  = 0. Note also that
d c
1/d  =   [     (    1)]
  2 [      (    1)], which is positive because      (    1)   1 and
    (  1)      (  1) =  > 0. Last, d c
2/d  =     2 [      1(    1)]
  2 [    1 (  1)]
is negative for any   exceeding        (    1)/ .
(ii) We obtain the ranking  r
1 <     r
2, for r = o, ,csince all the thresholds  i are equal to
  in the absence of tax di erentials (  = 1) and because d r
1/d  < 0   d r
2/d  for r = o, ,c.
(iii) We further obtain the ranking   
1 < o
1 < c
1 because   
1 =  o
1  (1    )(P1/P2)
  1    1 <
 o
1 and because  c
1 =   [     (    1)]
  1 >    =  o
1 since      (    1)   1.
(iv) Finally, we get the ranking   
2 < c
2 < o
2 and  c
2   ˜  c
2. Indeed, we have   
2 < c
2
because d  
2/d  =0> d c
2/d . We furthermore have  c
2 =  o
2 [      1(    1)]
  1 < o
2 since
      1(    1) < 1 for any  >    . Also, by deﬁnition of ˜  c
2 = sup >b    c
2, we have  c
2 < ˜  c
2.  
Proof of Corollary 2. We compute the limits of the thresholds in Proposition 4 when      .
First of all, we have          (1    )e (1  ) where e =2 .71828...denotes Euler’s number. It is
then immediate to verify that  c
1  = (1    ) e (1  ) . Furthermore,  c
2  = (1    )  1e (1  )  1
if         (or equivalently     (1    )), whereas ˜  c
2  = e 1 if  <     (or equivalently  < (1    )).
Next, we have  o
1  =  (1    )e (1  ),  o
2  =   1(1    )e (1  ),   
1  =    and   
2  = (1  
 )e (1  ). Finally, we obtain   
1  =    because lim    (P1/P2)
  1 =( m2 + x2)/(m1 + x1)=1
is ﬁnite, whereas    1    . At that limit, we then have  r
1  < r
2 , r = o, ,c, whereas
  
1  < o
1  < c
1  and   
2  < c
2  < o
2 .  
29Proof of Proposition 4. Let      1/ 2 < 1. Given a transfer pricing rule r = o, ,c, consumers’
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,
which yields condition (32) for the OECD rules. We now provide su cient conditions under which
(32) is satisﬁed. First, condition (32) is satisﬁed for small tax di erences. To see this, let
G( )   ln
 








   1  
  ln
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and















Note that G(1) = H(1) = 0 since R1 = R2 in that case. Condition (32) then shows that Uc
1 >U c
2
if and only if G( ) >H( ). Let   =1   where  > 0 is small. Using a linear approximation, the
latter inequality becomes G(1)  G  (1) >H(1)  H  (1), i.e., G  (1) <H  (1). We readily obtain




 (1)   
  F   ( )
1   F ( )
<
   1
   1   1
,
which is always true since 0 <F ( )   1.
We next show that condition (32) is satisﬁed for the uniform distribution F(x)=x. Indeed,
given that assumption and using the deﬁnition of  , we get that Uc
1 >U c
2 if and only if
1   (1    )   1




1   1  
   
1
 
   1
1   (1    )   1
    
 
1   1  
    
   1 >
 
1   1  
    
 1     1
 
1   1  
   
1
 
 1     1
,
where numerators and denominators are positive. Deﬁning the function Z(y)   ln[1 y(  1)(1 
y)  1]+ ln[(1   y)1     1], this condition can be written more simply as Z (y2) >Z(y1) where
y2     1 (1    )/(     ) and y1    (1    )/(     ). Because  > ˆ  , we have the conditions
1/  > y2 >y 1 > (1  )2/(    )2. Therefore the condition Z (y2) >Z(y1) is satisﬁed if Z(y) is
an increasing function for any 0 < y < 1/ , which is always true because
Z
 (y)=(     1)
(1   y)[(1   y)     1] + (1   y)  1(1   y )
[(1   y)1     y(    1)] [1   (1   y)  1] (1   y)
> 0
Indeed, in this expression, the numerator and the denominator are positive because y<1/  < 1
and because (1 y)1    y(   1) is a function that is equal to 1 at y = 0 and increases to higher
values for y>0.  
30Proof of Proposition 5. We derive conditions under which (33) is satisﬁed. The proof is similar
to that of Proposition 4. First, condition (33) is satisﬁed for small tax di erences. Indeed, let
G( ) = ln
 








   1  
  ln[1   F ( )]
and
H ( ) = ln
 
 





  1   1
 
Note that G(1) = H(1) = 0. Condition (33) then becomes Uc
1 >U  
1 if and only if G( ) >H( ).
Let   =1    where  > 0 is small. Using a linear approximation, the foregoing inequality
becomes G(1)    G (1) >H (1)    H (1)    G  (1) <H   (1). We readily obtain G (1) =





1   
  F   ( )
1   F ( )
<
   1
   1   1
which is always true since 0 <F ( )   1.
Second, condition (33) is satisﬁed for the uniform distribution F(x)=x. To see this, note
that, using the deﬁnition of   and  , and after straightforward manipulation, condition Uc
1 >U  
1
becomes:
1   1  
 
  1
   
 
1   1  
   
1
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1   (1    )
 
   
  1
    >
 
   
  1
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1
1  1  
   
1
 
   1
  1
As in the proof of Proposition 4, we can use the function Z(y)   ln[1   y(    1)(1   y)  1]+
ln[(1   y)1     1], so that the last condition can be written more simply as Z (y2) >Z(y0) where
y2     1 (1    )/(     ) and y0   (1    )/(     ). Because  > ˆ  , we still have 1/  > y2 >
y0 > 0. Therefore the condition Z (y2) >Z(y0) is satisﬁed if Z(y) is an increasing function for
any 0 < y < 1/ , which we have proved in the proof of Proposition 4.  
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